Berkeley, the second in the line of the British
empiricism, is the founder of subjective
idealism. Subjective idealism is an epistemological position according to which
knowledge consists of ideas and ideas cannot exist apart from a mind. So, there
is no extra mental objective reality existing independently of mind. Berkeley,
who built his philosophic position following Locke’s empiricism, differs from
Locke in a number of ways. He specially rejects Locke’s concept of substance
and the primary qualities.
Though Berkeley uses the empiricism of Locke to establish
his position, he is far from following Locke’s common sense approach concerning
the existence of substance. Berkeley sets out to remove some of the rubbishes
from Locke’s philosophy. Berkeley denies the existence of substance and the
division between the primary qualities and the secondary qualities.
Berkeley introduces subjective idealism by his startling and provocative formula that “to be is to be perceived”, anything must be perceived in order to exist. Clearly this would mean that if something were not perceived, it would not exist. It was Locke’s philosophy that had raised doubt in Berkeley’s minds about the independent existence of things or matters that Locke sought as the source of sensory stimuli. Locke had failed to push his own theory of knowledge to conclusions that to Berkeley seemed inevitable.
Berkeley introduces subjective idealism by his startling and provocative formula that “to be is to be perceived”, anything must be perceived in order to exist. Clearly this would mean that if something were not perceived, it would not exist. It was Locke’s philosophy that had raised doubt in Berkeley’s minds about the independent existence of things or matters that Locke sought as the source of sensory stimuli. Locke had failed to push his own theory of knowledge to conclusions that to Berkeley seemed inevitable.
When Locke spoke of substance as “something we know
not what”, he was only a short step from saying that it was nothing, which Berkeley
did say. He denied the existence of the material substances and said that minds
and their ideas alone are real. Berkeley says ‘Esse est percipi’. It means
anything must be perceived in order to exist, no matter, but only qualities are
perceived and therefore there is nothing besides minds and their ideas. What,
for example is a cherry? It is soft, round, red, wet and fragrant. All these
qualities are ideas in the mind that the cherry has the power to produce
through the senses. So, that the softness is felt, the color is seen, the
roundness is felt or seen, the sweetness is tested and fragrance smelled. Again,
the very existence of all these qualities consists in their being perceived.
And apart from these qualities there is no sensed quality. The cherry, then,
represents a complex of sensation.
How Berkeley refutes Locke’s
primary qualities
Primary Qualities: Berkeley refutes
Locke’s theory of primary qualities and the division between the primary and
secondary qualities. Berkeley, like Locke, had shown that the secondary
qualities such as color, heat, round, taste, smell etc; are subjective. To a
jaundiced person everything appears to be yellow. The same water appears cold or
Luke-warm with the variation of conditions. He then proceeds to show that the
lot of primary qualities is no better. Firstly, primary qualities such as
extension, weight, motion, number etc vary with varying conditions like the
secondary qualities. The same thing looks larger when we are near of it than
when we are far off. The same motion appears fast to one and slow to other. The
same thing is one, thirty six or three accordingly as it measured by a yard, a
foot or an inch. Secondly, the proven and secondary qualities can’t be
perceived apart from each other. So, extension can’t be perceived apart from color
(by right) or heat and cold (by touch). The same arguments which make the
secondary qualities subjective are equally applicable to the primary qualities.
Is it possible, Berkeley asks, to separate primary and secondary qualities
“even in thought”?
Berkeley adds, I might as easily divide between
primary and secondary qualities. But in truth the object and the sensation are
the same thing and cannot therefore, be abstracted from each other. Since
substance or matter is never perceived or sensed, it cannot be said to exist.
Berkeley was perfectly aware of the potential nonsense involved in his idealistic hypothesis. Aware that his idealism would be ridiculed , Berkeley writes what therefore becomes of the sun, moon and stars? What must we thing of houses, rivers, mountains, trees, stones nay even of our own bodies? Are all these so many chimeras and illusions of fancy?
According to him, objects are not therefore unreal. They exist primarily in the mind of God; and our ideas of them are only the reproductions of divine ideas. The laws of nature are the ways in which God perceived these ideas and reproduced them in finite spirits.
Berkeley adds: I do not argue against the existence of
any one thing that we can apprehend either by sense or reflection. The only thing whose existence we deny is that
which philosophers call matter or corporal substance. And in doing of this,
there is no damage done to rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it,
says Berkeley.
In conclusion, we can say that in Berkeley’s theory a
thing is the sum of its perceived qualities and it is for this reason he argued
that to be is to be perceived, anything must be perceived in order to exist.
Since substance or matter is never perceived, it cannot be said to exist. If
substance does not exist and if sensed qualities alone are real then only
thinking as Berkeley says, spiritual beings exist.